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Abstract
We present  a model  that links  heterogeneity  of preferences  across ethnic  groups  in a city to
the amount  and type of public  good  the city supplies.  We test the implications  of the model  with
three related  data sets: U. S. cities,  U. S. metropolitan  areas, and U. S. urban counties.
Results show  that the shares  of spending  on productive  public  goods  -- education,  roads,
sewers  and trash pickup  -- in U. S. cities (metro  areas/urban  counties)  are inversely  related  to the
city's (metro  area's/county's)  ethnic  fragmentation,  even  after controlling  for other socioeconomic
and demographic  determinants.  We conclude  that ethnic  conflict  is an important  determinant  of
local public  finances.
Alberto  Alesina  Reza Baqir  William  Easterly
Harvard  University,  MIT  UC Berkeley  World  Bank
NBER and CEPR  Baqir@Econ.Berkeley.edu  WEasterly@Worldbank.org
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1"Many white Americans have turned against a strategy that emphasizes programs  they
perceive as benefiting only racial minorities  ...  Public services became identified mainly with
blacks, private services mainly with whites ... white taxpayers  saw themselves as being forced,
through taxes, to pay for  medical and legal services that many of them could not afford... " (page
193 andpage  202) from  Wilson (1996).
Introduction
When  individuals  have  different  preferences  they  want to pull fewer  resources  together  for
public  projects. This paper  argues  that certain  public  goods  - such as education,  roads, sewers  -
supplied  by U. S. cities  are inversely  related  to ethnic  fragmentation  in those cities.  In cities where
ethnic  groups are polarized,  and where  politicians  have  ethnic  constituencies,  the share of spending
that goes to public goods  is low. Representatives  of interest  groups with an ethnic  base are likely
to value only  the benefits  of public  goods  that accrue  to their groups,  and discount  the benefits  for
other  groups. This can  happen  for two non-mutually  exclusive  reasons. One  is that different
ethnic  groups  have different  preferences  over  which  type of public goods  to produce  with  tax
revenues. The second  is that each ethnic  group's utility  level for a given  public  good  is reduced  if
other  groups  also use it. Undervaluing  public  goods  provision,  political  actors  choose  to divert
more  public resources  to private  patronage.
The  finding  of this paper  is not that when  a particular  ethnic  group becomes  a majority  in
a particular  locality  it lowers  the provision  of public  goods. In fact, it turns out that our results  are
mainly  driven  by how  white  majority  cities  react to varying  minority  group  sizes. The finding  is
that voters choose  lower  public  goods  when  a significant  fraction  of tax revenues  collected  on one
ethnic  group are used to provide  public  goods  shared  with other  ethnic groups.
Here is an anecdote. Prince  George's  (PG) County,  a Maryland  county  next  to
Washington  DC, used  to have  a large  white  majority.  After the influx  of a large black  middle  class
made  the county  much  more  diverse  (although  whites  were still in the majority),  PG voters  passed
a law called  TRIM in 1978.  TRIM  puts a legal ceiling  on the property  tax rate, a binding
2constraint  on the main  source  of revenue  for school  financing. Observers  conventionally  cite
TRIM as one reason for poor schools  in PG County.  The county  next door  to PG County  is
Montgomery  County,  also a DC suburb.  Montgomery  is regionally  (and even  nationally)  famous
for the quality  of its public  schools.  Montgomery  has a much  larger white  majority  and so is less
ethnically  diverse  than PG. Montgomery  voters  have  decisively  rejected  tax limitation  laws on
several  occasions.  While  Montgomery  residents  are 47 percent  richer  than PG residents,  on
average,  the disparity  in public schools  appears  to be greater  than can be explained  by this income
difference.  For example,  Montgomery  County  collects  2.4 times  more  local education  revenue  per
pupil  than does PG County.
It is hardly  a new insight  to argue  that urban problems  in America  have  something  to do
with ethnic  conflict.  Conventional  wisdom  particularly  points  to racial  tension  in public  education.
We,  however,  go well  beyond  this point and document  specifically  how ethnic  fragmentation
influences  local public  goods,  as reflected  in the composition  of spending,  the aggregate  total of
spending,  and the budget  balance.'
The paper is organized  as follows. Section  I reviews  some of the most relevant  literature
for our question. Section  II develops  a simple  model  that illustrates  the relationship  between
polarization  of preferences  and public  good  provision. Section  III presents empirical  evidence
drawn  from cities,  metropolitan  areas, and urban counties. Section  IV discusses  many  issues  of
sensitivity  analysis. The last section  concludes  and indicates  possibilities  for further  research.
I. Previous literature
Our paper crosses  the boundaries  of several  branches  of the literature. First, we have  a
small  (but rapidly  growing)  literature  that seeks  to explain  formation  of borders  of political
1  The  problem  of ethnic  polarization  is not limited  to blacks  versus  whites. As  Wilson  [19961  points
out "antagonism  toward  inner  city  blacks  is frequently  expressed  in the  Latino  neighborhoods  that  border
the  new  poverty  areas."  The  same  author  emphasizes  also  the  Korean  versus  inner  city  blacks  tensions
which  exploded  in incidents  in New  York  and  Los  Angeles.
3jurisdictions,  as a function  of diversity  of individual  preferences  and economies  of scale in the
financing  and of public  goods. In particular,  the model  of the present  paper is related  to the one  by
Alesina  and Spolaore  [1997]. On the empirical  side,  Easterly  and Levine [19971  report  a strong
negative  correlation  across countries  between  ethnic  diversity  (as measured  by language)  and
indicators  of public  goods,  such  as numbers  of telephones,  percentage  of roads paved,  efficiency  of
the electricity  network,  and years of schooling.  They  conclude  that ethnic  diversity  has something
to do with Africa's poor economic  growth. 2
Second,  a burgeoning  literature  on income  inequality  describes  how neighborhood
segregation  by class (which  has a strong ethnic  dimension,  although  this is not emphasized  by this
literature)  can play  havoc  with the public  provision  of education.  Durlauf [1996]  and Benabou
[1996a]  develop  models  that show  how  city-suburb  polarization  is inefficient  for human  capital
accumulation  with local school  financing. However,  attempts  to equalize  spending  in a polarized
society  only weaken  support  for spending  on schooling. 3
Several  recent  empirical  papers on topics related  to ours that feature  U. S. city data are
those  by Glaeser,  Scheinknan,  and Shleifer  [1995],  Cutler  and Glaeser [1995],  Poterba [1996],
Luttmer  [19971  and Goldin  and Katz [19981.  Glaeser,  Scheinkman,  and Shleifer  [1995]  find that
one  measure  of city  health -- population  growth  - is worse  in cities with a higher  percentage
nonwhite  population  (although  this effect  weakens  with unemployment  and schooling  controls).
Cutler  and Glaeser  [19951  find  that blacks  have  worse  outcomes  on education,  income,  and other
social  dimensions  in more  segregated  metropolitan  areas. Perhaps  poor public  goods outcomes
mnight  contribute  to explaining  these adverse  outcomes  in racially  polarized  cities. Poterba  [1996]
2  They  also  find  that  financial  repression  is more  severe  and black  market  premia  are  higher  in
ethnically  diverse  countries.  (As  an aside,  popular  discussion  often  compare  troubled  American  cities  to
Third  World  countries.  The  American  international  aid  agency,  USAID,  even  gave  advice  to Baltimore
about one kind of public  goods  supply  -- childhood  immunization).
4finds  that a larger  fraction  of elderly  in a jurisdiction  leads  to lower  publi  spending  on education.
interestingly,  and in accordance  with  the argument  of this paper, he also finds  that "this reduction
is particularly  large  when  the elderly  residents  and the school  age  population  are from different
racial  groups." Cutler,  Elmendorf,  and Zeckhauser  (19931  find support  for their hypothesis  that
people  have "discriminatory  community  preferences"  where  they only "care about  the welfare  of
others  within  their {ethnic}  community  (P. 180)."  Likewise,  Luttmer  [19971  shows  empirically  that
"individuals  increase  their support  for welfare  spending  if a larger  fraction of welfare  recipients  in
their area belongs  to their  racial group  (p.  1)." Goldin  and Katz [1998]  study  the period  (early  this
century)  in which  universal  and publicly  fimded  education  became  predominant  in the United
States. They find  that "more  ethnic  and religious  homogeneity  fostered  high school  expansion  from
1910  to 1930  (p.1)."
Third,  a large local  public  finance  literature  inspired  by Tiebout's model  bears on our
topic, and focuses  on the problem  that heterogeneity  of citizens  creates for public  good provision
(Rubinfield  [1987]). Tiebout's [19561  resolution  of the heterogeneity  problem  was that people  can
sort themselves  into  communities  that provide  the public  goods  they want. However,  subsequent
literature  has pointed  out numerous  problems  with Tiebout  sorting,  such as the restricted  number
of communities,  the multidimensional  nature of public goods,  limitations  to mobility,  and
economics  of scale  in public  goods  provision  Rubinfeld  [1987];  Atkinson  and Stiglitz  [19801.  The
social externalities  raised  by the inequality  literature,  as discussed  above,  also complicate  the
predictions  of the Tiebout  model.  Finally  there are legal constraints  to extreme  segregation  by
ethnic  group, even  if these  constraints  are only very partially  effective. 4 Thus, despite  the
3  Borjas  (1995]  finds  that  there  are  "ethnic  capital"  effects  even  after  controlling  for neighborhood
effects.  This  may  create  incentives  for segregation  along  ethnic  as well  as class  lines,  although  Boijas  does
not explore  this  particular  implication.
4  Examples  are  fair housing  laws,  housing  discrimination  lawsuits,  and recent  court  battles  over
locating  subsidized  public  housing  (mainly  occupied  by  blacks)  in wealthy  white  communities.
5possibility  of sorting,  heterogeneous  preferences  within  a community  will  not disappear  in practice.
This is all we need  for our model.
In addition,  the empirical  local public  finance  literature  has one finding  which  may be
relevant  to our study. Many  studies  of individual  preferences  find  that blacks  are more supportive
of spending  on public education  than whites. 5 This is interesting  because  it suggests  that any
association  of increased  ethnic  diversity  (which  often  means  more  blacks in the U. S. data) with
lower public education  is not due to the fact that blacks  themselves  have a lower  demand  for public
education.
Fourth,  the sociological  literature  has also pointed  to ethnic  divisions  as a problem  for
public  goods  provision.  Lieberman  [1993]  writes  that: "Ethnic  groups  must reach  an
accommodation  on various issues.  As the accommodations  become  more  distasteful  to one or more
groups,  the disaffected  parties become  more  supportive  of alternatives  to public education
(p.  171)."  The implication  of this fact is a vicious  circle,  emphasized  most vocally  by Wilson
[1987, 19961.  Poor minorities  in highly  segregated  cities  need  good  public schools  to improve  their
skills,  but public  schools  provision  is low because  of ethnic  conflict. The relative  skill  levels  of
minorities  in ghettos  does  not improve  and their  poverty  level increases,  making  problems  of
central  cities' unemployment  and decay  even  worse  - and ethnic  conflicts  even  more acute.
II.  Theory
We first present  the basic  model  and then  discuss several  extensions.
A. The  Basic Model
Consider  a political  jurisdiction  in which  the population  size is normalized  at 1, with no
loss of generality. There  is no mobility  in or out of the  jurisdiction.  The  members  of the
jurisdiction  have to decide,  by majority  rule, on a public  good,  both on its size  and type. Public
5  See  Rubinfeld  et al. [1987]  for references  and summary.
6goods can be of different types, and different individuals have different preferences over them. The
generic individual i's utility function is given by
ui  =  ga(1  - 11)  +  c
0  <  a  < 1.
where g is the public good, which can be located anywhere on an ideological line capturing
different individuals' preferences; 1I  is the preference distance between individual i most preferred
type of public good and the actual public good; c is private consumption. Income is exogenous and
equal for everybody. 7 Private consumption is equal to disposable income:
(2)  c  = y  - t,
where  y is the exogenous pre-tax income and t is the lump-sum tax which, by assumption, is
identical for everyone. This is natural, since everybody has the same pre-tax income, and a
standard assumption in public finance is that taxes cannot be a function of individual preferences. 8
Note that since the population size is normalized  at  1, per capita and aggregate variables are
identical, so, for instance, g represents the size of the public good both in the aggregate and per
capita terms.  Then, the public budget constraint implies that
g  = t.
Using (1), (2) and (3) we can rewrite individual preferences as follows:
Ui  =  ga  (1  - li  +  Y  - g
6  This is, of course,  a restrictive  assumption.  One could generalize  the model  to a situation  where
individuals  could move but with  some costs.  With moving  costs  complete  stratification  would  not ocu  in
theory,  nor is it observed  in practice.  See  Epple and Romer [19911  for the effect of mobility  on voting on
local public  goods.
7  In the working  paper version of this paper we  present an extension  in which  individual  income  is a
function  of the public  good.
There  is a connection  here with the literature  on revelation  mechanisms  which we do not explore.
7This political  jurisdiction  has to decide,  by majority  rule, on the size and the type of the public
good. We make  the following  assumption  on the voting  process:
Individuals  vote  first on the amount  of taxation  (thus  on the size of the  public good), and
then on the type of the  public good
This assumption  is made for tractability,  in order  to avoid  issues  of multidimensional
voting,  which  is not our focus. Also,  note  that this order of voting  resembles  common  budget
procedures  in which  the size  of the budget  is decided  before  its composition. 9
We now solve  the model  backward,  starting  with  the following  result,  which  derives  from a
straightforward  application  of the median  voter  theorern,  and is a slight  generalization  of a result
by Alesina  and Spolaore  [19971.
Proposition 1:  For any positive  amount  of public  good,  g, the type  chosen  is the one most
preferred  by the median  voter.
Let us now consider  the choice  of the size  of the public  good,  g.  Individual  i's preferred
size is given  by the result  of the following  problem:
Max  U, = ga(l-i)  +y-g
where ii is the distance  of the individual  t from  the ideal type  of the median  voter. This
formulation  incorporates  the fact that the voters  know  that, after a decision  is reached  on the size  of
g, the type  chosen  is the one most  preferred  by the median  voter. The solution  of (5) (g2)  is:
(6)  [a  )I('a
9  For  a recent  discussion  of  budget  procedures  see  the  survey  of  the literature  by  Alesina  and Perotti
[19961.
8Define i,m  the median  distance  from  the type  most preferred  by the median  voter, in short  the
"median  distance  from  the median." A straightforward  application  of the median  voter  fheorem
implies  the following  result:
ProDosition  2: The amount  of public  good  provided  in equilibrium  is given  by
= [a(l  i
From Proposition  2, it follows  that
Corollarv: The equilibrium  amount  of public  good is decreasing  in  inm,  the "median  distance  from
the median."
The "median  distance  from  the median"  can be considered  an indicator  of polarization  of
preferences,  as illustrated  in Figure 1. Panel  (a) shows  a case of low "median  distance  from the
median,"  panel  (b) shows  a case  of a larger  "median  distance  from  the median." The picture of
panel (b) is an example  of a polarized  society,  wiih two separate  groups  with relatively
homogenous  preferences  within  the  group, but very distinct  preferences  across  groups.
In sumnuary,  if iit is high,  a large fraction  of the population  have  preferences  which  are
very far from the chosen  type of public  good,  therefore  they would  prefer  to keep  taxes low and
devote  more  resources  to pnvate consumption  rather  than public  consumption.  A jurisdiction  with
two (or more)  polarized  groups  (like  panel  b of figure 1) is a prime  example  of high "median
distance  from  the median."
A  Discussion
We now discuss  several  issues  not explicitly  addressed  in this basic  simple  model,  and how
to bring the model  to the data.
9In our theoretical  model,  the preference  polarization  that fuels interest  group conflict  is
assumed,  and not related  to ethnicity  or race. In the empirical  work  which  follows  in the next
sections,  we use ethnic  composition  (which  is easily  observable)  to capture conflicts  amongst
groups.  We need  to justify this choice.
Much scholarly  and general  writing  suggests  that preferences  about  public policy  and
ethnic  origins  are strongly  correlated,  and political  conflicts  over public policies  are more  and more
often  fought  along  ethnic  dividing  lines.  Wilson  [1996],  Page [1996],  Bell [1992],  Hacker  [1995],
Kozol [1991],  Huckfeldt  and Kohfeld  [1989],  amongst  numerous  others, argue  that conflicts  over
public  policy  in general  and public  goods  provisions  in particular,  are more  and more  determined
by racial  cleavages  not class cleavages.  Their  titles are sufficiently  eloquent:  "Two  Nations:  Black
and White,  Separate,  Hostile,  and Unequal" [Hacker]  and "Race  and the  Decline of Class  in
American  Politics" [Huckfeldt  and Kohfeld].' 0
For illustrative  examples  of polarized  preferences  over public  goods,  consider  first
language  instruction  in public  schools.  Without  commenting  on what is desirable  public  policy,
let's describe  the actual reaction  of different  ethnic  groups  to language  instruction  in, say, Oakland
California.  Language  is an issue for blacks  in Oakland,  as witness  the recent  furor over  the
proposal  by the Oakland  School  Board  that black  English  be recognized  as a separate  language
("Ebonics").  Although  far from consensus  on the Ebonics  extreme,  many  blacks feel  that inner  city
black  children  speaking  non-standard  English  have a right  to programs  that meet their needs.
Many  Hispaniuc  parents  complain  of insufficient  public  resources  for their children  to get English
'°  Huckfeldt  and Kohfeld  [19891  present  several  case  studies  of city  politics  with  racial  cleavages  which
are  consistent  with  the spirit  of  our  paper. An  excellent  example  is their  discussion  of St.  Louis  in the
early  to mid eighties  (pages 18-22). As another  polarization  anecdote,  they note that all-white  precincts  in
the 1985 St. Louis  mayoral  election  of a white against a black  candidate  voted for the white candidate  by a
margin of 40 to 1. Many  such examples  exist: only  23 percent of white (usually  Democratic)  New
Yorkers  voted  for the black Democratic  mayoral  incumbent  David  Dinkins; only 12 percent of (usually
Democratic)  Chicago  whites  voted for the black  Democratic  mayoral  candidate  in 1983 [Hacker  1995,  p.
231].
10as a Second Language classes or bilingual education. Many Hispanics reacted with hostility to the
ill-fated Ebonics proposal as "a thinly veiled effort to grab bilingual funds." Black parents
responded that bilingual education has diverted resources away from addressing the special needs
of their  children. Asian parents in turn complain that Hispanic children get more bilingual
resources than do their children.  For their part, many whites have objected to the diversion of any
resources to any non-standard-English instruction."  If all ethnic groups are dissatisfied, this may
be a good indication of polarized groups who have wound up at an unhappy position in the middle.
The result, according to our theoretical model, is that a jurisdiction spends less on public education
than they would have in the absence of such polarization.'2
Ethnic groups can have polanrzed  preferences even over a seemingly neutral public good
like highways. When ethnic groups are segregated within a city, these groups will have different
travel patterns within the city. Then these groups will have different preferences for the location of
major road arteries: each group wants the road arteries to be convenient to their own travel
patterns. At the same time, no ethnic neighborhood itself wants to be bisected or isolated by an
expressway. Kozol [1991, p. 180] argues that the Dan Ryan Expressway in Southside Chicago
(built several decades ago) had a destructive effect on the Wentworth Avenue black neighborhood
that was cut off from the rest of the city by the Expressway. Wilson [1996] also emphasizes how
race relations have a significant impact on the choice of the geographical distributions of roads and
urban transportation systems.
Thus if, say, a white person perceives that a public good is enjoyed mostly by black
citizens, he would oppose it precisely for that reason. In other words, the identity of the
I  I  The "thinly  veiled" quote is from Los  Angeles  Times, January 19, 1997,  Part A, Page 1. This section
is based  largely  on a series  of articles  by the LA Times  during  the "Ebonics" controversy.  Note  that
Oakland  is 13th  in the nation  on ETEIC.  There  has not been complete  white flight from the Oakland
public schools,  as the population  of Oakland is about one-third  white while the share of private  schools  in
enrollment  is only 13 percent.
11beneficiaries  of the public  good  directly  influences  the utility level  of each  individual.  This
mechanism  would  reinforce  the argument  put forward  in our model,  namely  that more ethnic
fragmentation  leads  to fewer  resources  pooled  together  to provide  non-excludable  public  goods.
Finally,  it is clear  that ethnicity  is not the only determinant  of individual  preferences  over
public  goods.  Certainly,  income  is another  one,  therefore  the distribution  of income,  in addition  to
ethnic  fagmnentation,  could  be an important  determinant  of the distribution  of preferences  over
public  goods.  This is why in the empirical  work  we control  for income  distribution  measures,  in
our attempt  to isolate  the effects  of ethnic  fragmentation.' 3
C. Patronage,  Budget Shares, and Fiscal  Discipline
Our simple  model  considered  only one  type of public  expenditure,  a non-excludable  public
good.  In practice,  public  expenditure  can also be directed  specifically  to certain  groups.  For
instance,  think  of targeted  transfers, or public employment  used for patronage." Interest  group
politics  may lead  to an increase  in group  targeted  spending  and patronage  spending  via "log-
rolling,"  and, by the arguments  discussed  above,  a reduction  in the provision  of public  goods." 5
This consideration  is important  for the empirical  analysis  which  follows,  which  focuses  mostly  on
shares  and to a lesser  extant on levels  of public  goods.  Suppose  that public  spending  can be divided
into  two parts: one, labeled  gl, is mostly  patronage;  the other,  g2,  is a non excludable  public  good,
that only imperfectly  can be targeted  to specific  groups.  Total spending  is g-gl+g2 . An increase  in
group  polarization  and interest  group  politics  would  lead to a larger  increase  in gi, which  is almost
pure patronage,  relative  to the increase  in g2, which  is almost  purely  public.  In fact g2  may even
12  Goldin  and  Katz [19981  present  evidence  from  the first  part  of  this century  consistent  with  this
implication.
13  Meltzer  and Richards  [19811  are  a "classic"  reference  on  the  effect  of  income  distribution  on  the
social  choice  of the  size  of  redistributive  programs.
14  See  Alesina,  Baqir  and  Easterly  [1997]  for  a discussion  of the  effect  of ethnic  fragmentation  on
employment  in U. S. cities.
12decrease  in level, if the public  good element  in it predominates.  In other  words,  polarization  would
certainly  lead  to a decrease  in the share of non-excludable  public  goods  on total spending,  that is,
the share  =  is decreasing  in polarization.  However  to the extent  that even  g2 can be targeted
g1 + 92
to specific  groups,  the level  of  g2 may actually  increase  with interest  group  politics.  Thus, we have
stronger  implications  for the effects  of polarization  on the share of spending  on pure public goods
than on their level.  Finally,  the implication  of different  levels  of polarization  on total government
spending  are ambiguous,  because  of the opposite  effect  of pressure  for more  group specific
spending  programs,  and less non  excludable  public  goods.
Our model  is static, and has no implication  on the budget  balance.  However,  a related
literature  suggests  that socio-political  fragmentation  may lead  to conflicts  over  the allocation  of the
tax burden  that may lead  to the postponement  of deficit  reduction  policies." 6 The empirical  evidence
supportive  of this view is drawn  from OECD  countries  and U. S. states.'  In the empirical  analysis
below we will  check  whether  ethnic  fragmentation  at the local level  has any implication  on the
fiscal  balance  of local governments.
The implications  of the above  theoretical  discussion  are as follows:  1)  the composition  of
public  spending  is a fimction  of ethnic  fragmentation:  the share of public  goods  spending  is lower
in more  ethnically  fragmented  localities;  2) the sign  of the correlation  between  the size  of
government  spending  and ethnic  fragmentation  is not determined  a priori,  since  transfers  and
patronage  spending  may  be positively  related  to ethnic  fragmentation  and public  goods  negatively
15  A  vast literature  has  discussed  how  interest  group  pressure  leads  to an increase  in spending
specifically  targeted  to certain  special  interests.  A classic  reference  is Weingast,  Shepsle,  and  Jonhnsen
[1981].
16  For  theoretical  models  with  this implication  see  Alesina  and  Drazen  [1991]  and Velasco  [1994].
17  See  Roubini  and Sachs  [1988],  Alesina  and Perotti  119951  and Kontopoulos  and  Perotti  [19971  on
OECD  countries  and  Poterba  [1995]  and Alt  and  Lowry  [1995]  on US states.
13related  to the same  variable;  3) fiscal discipline  is more  problematic  in ethnically  fragmented
localities.
III.  The Empirical  Evidence
We test our hypotheses  with  three cross-section  samples  of public goods  spending  in U. S.
urban localities:  cities,  metropolitan  areas, and counties.
A.  Data and  Sources
We use the ethnic  fractionalization  (ETHNIC)  index  as a measure  of ethnic  fragmentation.
ETHNIC  measures  the probability  that two randomly  drawn  people  from a city, county  or
metropolitan  area belong  to different  ethnic  groups."  Specifically,  we consider  the population
distribution  by race and we construct  ETBNIC  as follows:
(8)  ETHNIC= 1-  .(Race )
where  Race,  denotes  the share of population  self-identified  as of race i and
i = (White, Black, Asian and Pacific Islander, American Indian, Other)
We follow  the racial classification  used by the U. S. Census.  These  classifications  are
somewhat  arbitrary but they also reflect  which  ethnic  groupings  are politically  salient.  Note that
"Hispanic"  is not a mutually  exclusive  category  with these  racial classifications  in the Census;
Hispanic  is reported  separately  as the answer  to a different  question  on "origin".  However,  there is
a high correlation  (0.9) between  Hispanic  and "Other"  in the above  classification.  Many  Hispanics
apparently  respond  "other"  because  they  do not feel accurately  represented  in the multiple  racial
choice  provided  by the Census.  1 9 For practical  purpose,  then, the category  "other"  is essentially
"Hispanic."
s  This is the same  measure  used  for  linguistic  groups  in nations  by Canning  and  Fay 11993],  Mauro
[19951,  Easterly  and  Levine  [19961,  and many  others.
9  Data  is available  from  some  states  on the  matching  between  Hispanic  and Other.  In California  in
1990,  49.5 percent  of  Hispanics  chose  one  of  the  existing  racial  categories  and  50.5 percent  chose
"Other."  92  percent  of Hispanics  who  chose  a racial  category  in California  chose  "White".  [Hacker  1995,
14We made  an effort  to collect  data at different  levels  of aggregation  - cities, metropolitan
areas and countries  -- for three reasons.  First, there  is going  to be far more  Tiebout  sorting  between
city and suburb  of one metropolitan  area than between  different  metropolitan  areas. Comparing
the results  at different  levels  of aggregation  will  give us some  idea  of the possible  biases introduced
by Tiebout  sorting  (although  we also use instruments  for possibly  endogenous  right hand side
variables). Second,  none of the datasets  has an exact match  between  the unit of observation  and
the relevant  jurisdiction  for voting  on the public  good  for all types of public goods. Different  types
of public  goods  have  different  jurisdictions,  and  the  jurisdictions  themselves  are politically
determined.  Testing  all of our results at different  levels  of  jurisdiction  will give  us some  idea
whether  the results are affected  by these  problems.  Third,  and most prosaically,  some  variables
have data at one  jurisdictional  level  but not at others.
Our county,  metropolitan,  and city data come  from the County  and City Data Book, 1994
(CCD)  published  by the Bureau  of Census. 20 This publication  provides  data on a variety  of
subjects  for a cross-section  of U. S. counties,  metropolitan  areas, cities, and places. "Cities"  in the
source  are incorporated  places  that had a 1990  population  of 25,000 or more. Expenditures  are
assigned  to the governmental  level  that executes  them, regardless  of whether  they are financed  by
transfers  from higher  levels  of government. 2' Nearly  all the data in this publication  comes  from  the
Bureau  of the Census  and other federal  agencies. Most of our data refers to the year 1990,  unless
p. 6, 253].  When  "Hispanics"  respond  to the race  question  with  "white"  or "black"  rather  than  "other",  it
may  suggest  they  identify  more  with  that ethnic  category  than  with  being  "Hispanic"  - which  is what  is
relevant  for our  purposes.
20  Electronically  we  obtained  the  data  from  their  CD-ROM  version.
21  See  the  data  appendix  for  more  details.  We  obtained  these  definitions  from  the statistical  publications
mentioned  below  and from  a long,  albeit  nearly  incomprehensible,  document  called  the Government
Finance  and  Employment  Classification  Manual  [Census  Bureau,  19921.
15otherwise stated, and uses the city and county data files.  Especially for metropolitan and county
data, we have supplemented CCD with data from the publication City and County Plus (CCP).22
Our city sample, which includes places with 25,000 population and above, is 1020
observations. As described in the Appendix, we systematically checked each dataset by sorting
each variable and examining extreme values. Our metro areas sample consists of 304 observations.
The county sample is 1386 observations. Because we are focusing on urban public goods, we have
excluded sparsely populated rural counties; we chose a county population cutoff of 25,000 to
match the CCD's  cutoff for cities.23
Less systematically, we looked whether the data made sense based on our (admittedly
superficial) knowledge of U. S. cities. We note, for exarnple, that the top seven cities for share of
the population with a college degree are all college  towns. 24 The two cities with the highest income
inequality are Beverly Hills, CA and Miami Beach, FL. Beverly Hills is also the richest city with
an income that is ten times that of the poorest - Pharr, TX. The top recipient of intergovernmental
transfers is Washington DC, and this city has also the largest deficit before transfers (New York
City is close behind Washington, DC in these categories).
Table I reports the names and definitions of all the variables used in this paper.  Table II
reports summary statistics for the city sample.  Analogous tables for the other samples are reported
in the Appendix. In the city sample, our measure of ethnic fragmentation, ETHNIC, ranges from
22  Available  from Slater  Hall Information  Products  in both hard copy and CD-ROM We obtain  data
from earlier years  from City  and County  Compendium  (CCC), distributed  on CD-ROM  by Slater  Hall
Infornation Products.
23  Note that there are counties  with as few as 52 inhabitants!  We omitted  a small number  of
observations  in each sample  that a priori made no sense - such as zero city government  spending  in a
couple  of cities -- as described  in the data appendix.  In any case, our results  are robust  to simply  using the
full  available  sample  without  removing  any data anomalies  (although  we think it is better to remove
observations  that don't make sense). Resuts obtained  using  all the observations  are available  and are
virtually identical  to those  presented  in the text.
24  In decreasing  rank, East Lansing  MI, Chapel  Hill NC, West  Layfayette  IN, State College  PA, Palo
Alto CA, Ann Arbor  M[, Davis  CA.
16.014 (for Gloucester,  MA)  to .73 (for Carson,  CA).25  For the sample  of metropolitan  areas,
ETHNIC  ranges  from .024 (Dubuque,  IA)  to .61 (Los Angeles  - Long Beach,  CA)  with a median
of .247.  For the County  sample  ETHNIC  ranges  from .007 (Wayne  County,  WV) to .677 (Bronx
County,  NY).
B  Results
We discuss  the controls  we will use, presents  results  of different  local fiscal  variables
regressed  on ETHNIC  and controls,  and then  discuss  some  sensitivity  checks.
We are interested  in the effect  of ethnic  fractionalization  (ETHNIC)  on various  fiscal
variables. For each regression,  in addition  to ETHNIC,  we will  include  control  variables.  Our first
control  variable  is income  per capita,  since  more  developed,  richer  cities may  have  more  public
goods.  Our second  control  is city size,  for which  we use the log of 1990  population. The
relationship  between  public  goods  and ethnic  fragmentation  may be driven  by city size--with  big
cities  being  more  fragmented  and having  "ghettos." Also  there  are important  scale factors  in
public  goods. Educational  attainment  might  be another  possible  omitted  variable  from our model,
with more  educated  cities choosing  better city  policies,  demanding  more  education  for their
children,  and/or  monitoring  the provision  of their public  goods. For educational  attaimnent  we use
BAGRAD,  which  is the fraction  of population  aged  25 or over which  has completed  college  or a
higher  degree.
The next control  is income  inequality. One may  argue  that polarization  of preferences  is a
function  of polarization  of income  levels,  rather  than race. Therefore,  income  inequality,  not ethnic
fragmentation,  might  explain  the pattem of provision  of public  goods. Our measure  of income
25  Since  we  have  5 ethnic  groups,  the  maximum  that  ETHNIC  could  theoretically  reach  in our
framework  is .8,  which  would  occur  if each  of  the 5 ethnic  groups  accounted  for  20 percent  of  the
population.
17inequality  is the ratio of the mean  household  income  to the median  household  income  in a
jurisdiction. 26 We will later add the poverty  rate as a robustness  check.
We also control  for the age structure,  measured  as the percentage  of population  that is 65
or older. The empirical  local  public  good  literature,  briefly  reviewed  above,  has emphasized  the
role of age structure  as detenninant  of preferences  for public  goods,  most obviously  for education.
Table Im illustrates  our approach  with the example  of a regression  for the city's share of
spending  on roads. The share of city spending  on roads decreases  with higher  ethnic  diversity:  in all
the regressions  the coefficient  on ETHNIC  is highly  significant  with t-statistic ranging  from  -4.7
to -8.7.  The  magnitude  of the coefficient  has a nice shorthand  interpretation  in this and in all the
other  regressions  -- it is the amount  by which  the  dependent  variable  (in this case fraction  of city
spending  on roads)  would  change  going from  complete  ethmic  homogeneity  (ETHNIC=O)  to
complete  heterogeneity  (ETHNIC=1).27  Hence,  a move  from complete  homogeneity  to
heterogeneity  would  lower  the roads spending  share by around .09 (nine  percentage  points).  In
terms of our sample  variation,  a one standard  deviation  change  in ETHNIC  would  change  the share
of spending  on roads by one-quarter  of a standard  deviation.
ETEIC  remains  significant  after including  control  variables.  The share of spending  on
roads is inversely  related  to population  size,  to income  inequality,  and to age structure.  We now
present  all our results organized  by groups  of related  variables.
Table IV (like  Table V that will  follow)  is organized  in this way: the first column  identifies
the dependent  variable. The  following  two columns  report  the coefficients  and the t-statistics  of the
variable  ETENIC in two different  regressions  which  are identical  to regression  1 (no controls)  and
26  Note  that  this is the  theoretically  appropriate  measure  of  income  inequality  in any  model  based  upon
the  median  voter  theorem  applied  to fiscal  decisions.
27  Although  again  remember  that  complete  heterogeneity  is not possible  in our  data  because  we  have
only  5 ethnic  groups  - constraining  ETHIC to a maximum  of .8  - we  mention  this  interpretation  only
because  of  its heuristic  ease.
18regression 6 (all controls) reported in full in Table 111.2S  We report in Table IV our results for all
three samples: cities, metropolitan areas, and countries. The control variables are the same in all
three samples.  The only difference is that for metropolitan areas and counties we present results
using two stages least squares. We instrument for both ETHNIC and Income per capita, using the
values of ETHNIC and Income per capita in 1979-80. (Results using OLS are similar and are
available upon request. We did not have the earlier data to use as instruments for the city sample.)
When a dependent variable does not appear in all three samples it is because of data availability.
The pattern of results on the other control variables is reasonable. 29
The results on ETHNIC are quite striking. ETHNIC is negatively associated with the
share in the budget of three "productive" public goods: education, roads, and sewerage and tash
pickup.  We consider this result to be the main empirical result of the paper, since these are the
variables for which the theory made an unambiguous prediction, as discussed in subsection II.C.
The roads result for cities we have already featured in Table 1II. We now see that this
result on roads is robust across all three samples. We also estimate the effect of ETHNIC on the
level of roads spending  per capita rather than as a share of the budget; although theoretically
ambiguous, this effect is negative and significant in all three samples. The other levels results also
usually have the same sign and significance as the corresponding share variable. 30
28  For the sake  of completeness  we also report in this table the regressions  on the expenditure  share on
roads,  which are, of course,  identical  to those of Table  3. We have also  checked  that the results  on
ETHNIC  are robust  to adding  one control  variable at a time, like  in Table 3. Our results are indeed robust.
29  To anticipate  the most robust  effects  of the other  control  variables  across all our regressions:  income
has a positive  effect  on the share of spending  on police,  road spending  per capita,  local education  revenue
collected  per student,  and taxes and spending  per capita. Local  income has a negative  effect  on federal
and state education  revenue  per pupil. Population  size has a positive  effect  on education  spending  per
pupil, taxes per capita, federal,  state, and local revenue  per pupil, and a negative  effect on share of health
spending. The fraction with  a college  degree  has a negative  effect  on intergovernmental  transfers,  and a
positive  effect  on education  revenue  collected  per student.  Inequality  has a negative  effect  on education
spending  per pupil. The percent of the population  65-and-up  has a positive  effect  on education  spending
per pupil (oddly  enough)  but a negative  effect on the share of spending  going to education.  Complete
results  are available  upon request
30  In the county  sample  with  the full set of controls,  health spending  per capita and police spending  per
capita  are significantly  and positively  related  to ETHNIC,  while education  spending  per pupil and welfare
19The share of spending  for welfare  is also negatively  associated  with ETHNIC  in both the
metro  and county  samples  (the  only samples  for which  it is available),  even  though  in the metro
area sample  the bivariate  association  is only  marginally  significant  at conventional  levels. A one
standard  deviation  increase  in ETHNIC  is associated  with a fifth  of a standard  deviation  decrease
in the share of welfare  spending. We speculate  that ethnic  groups  dislike  re-distributive  progrms
that favor other groups. 3'
The share of expenditure  on police increases  with ETHNIC,  in all three samples. Police
spending  obviously  has something  to do with crime,  and indeed  the size  and significance  of this
coefficient  would  be reduced  if we controlled  for crime. The correlation  across cities  between
ETHNIC  and violent  crimes  per capita  is .48. We regard  crime as endogenous  to public goods
quantity,  income,  income  distribution,  and ethnic  diversity,  and so is one of the channels  through
which  these other  variables  influence  public choices. In any event,  in the sensitivity  discussion
below  we will  control  for crime.
Spending  on health and hospitals  increases  with ETHNIC  in the metro  and county  samples
(this item does  not usually  show  up in city budgets  and so is not,in  the city sample). We are not
sure why  this item, which  includes  a mixture  of public goods  provision  and transfers in the form of
subsidized  health  services,  is positively  related  to ETHIC.
Of course,  if most (but not all, remember  police)  shares are going  down  with ETHNIC,
some  other  shares  must be going  up. The categories  of spending  that Table IV includes  account
for, on average,  73 percent  of the budget  in the county  sample,  67 percent  of the budget  in metro
spending  per capita  were  significantly  and  negatively  related  to ETHNIC.  In other  words,  all the  level
variables  have  the same  signs  and significance  as  the share  variables  in the  county  sample.  In the  metro
sample  also,  all  the level  variables  have  the same  sign  as the share  variables  and  all are significant  except
for welfare  spending  per capita.  In the  city  sample,  ETNIC is negative  but  insignificant  for  sewerage
spending  per capita,  and  significantly  positive  for  fire  protection  spending  per capita  and  police  spending
per capita.
20areas, and 51 percent  of the budget  in cities. The  residual  includes  interest  payments  on debt and
various poorly  classified  and described  discretionary  programs. This "other"  unidentified  spending
could  include  "patronage,"  although  we have  no direct  evidence  that this is so. However,  the
looseness  in the definition  of these  other  programs  may indicate  room  for patronage  spending.  We
find in the city and county results -- although not in the metro sample - that this residual share is
positively,  significantly,  and robustly  related  to ETHNIC.
Table V reports results  on aggregate  fiscal  variables:  intergovernmental  transfers, deficits
and debt,  total spending,  and total revenues.  ETHIC  is positively  associated  with more
intergovernmental  transfers in the city, metro,  and county  samples  (although  only  the bivariate
association  is significant  in the city and metro  samples).  Namely,  more  ethnically  fragmented
localities  receive  more  transfers  per capita  from higher  levels  of government,  even  after controlling
for the level  of income  and its distribution.  Why  this is the case  is an interesting  politico-economic
question.  One interpretation  could  be the higher  level  of governments  try to compensate  ethnically
ftagnented communities  precisely  because  of the difficulties  that the latter have  in directing  local
resources  to the supply  of public  goods.  A more  cynical  explanation  is that more  ethnically
fragmented  localities  have  more  pressure  groups  that can lobby for support  from  higher  levels  of
government.3 2
There  is some evidence  that the fiscal  balance  before  intergovernmental  transfers  tends to
be worse  in more ethnically  fragmented  localities,  although  this result  is not robust across samples.
The only  robust result  on this point  comes  from  the city sample. Remember  that the theory  was
ambiguous  on this point. More  ethnically  fragmented  cities  have a larger  deficit  (or smaller
31  Page  [1996,  p. 2471  cites  a 1986  poll  in which  17  percent  of  whites  supported  increased  spending  on
programs  that primarily  assisted  blacks,  compared  to 74  percent  of  blacks.  See  also  Luttmer  1997  for
recent  evidence  on this  point
32  Note  that in this regression  we  are  controlling  for income  per capita,  so  the  fact  that ethnically
fragmented  locality  may  be  poorer  cannot  be a full  explanation  of this  finding.  The  correlation  between
21surplus)  even  after intergovernmental  transfers,  even  though  the latter are positively  associated
with fragmentation.  Although  the deficit  result  was not robust  in metropolitan  areas and countries,
those samples  featre  a related  robust  result  that accumulated  local debt  is positively  associated
with ETHNIC.
Total spending  is significantly  and positively  associated  with ETHNIC  in all three
samples. For example,  in the city sample,  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in ETHNIC  is
associated  with one-seventh  of a standard  deviation  increase  in spending  per capita.  A move  from
zero  to complete  heterogeneity  would  imply  an increase  in spending  per capita of 400-500  dollars.
This would  support  the "log-rolling"  extension  of the  theory  we discussed  in the theoretical  section,
Il.C.
The results on local tax revenues  are  not consistent.  Taxes are positively  associated  with
ETHNIC  in cities (although  the magnitude  of the tax increase  with ETHNIC is less  than half of the
spending  increase  with ETHNIC). Taxes are  negatively associated  with ETHNIC  in metro  areas
and counties  (although  the negative  association  is only significant  in the bivariate  relationship).
The strong  results on fiscal  aggregates  are on deficits  or debt, and total spending.  These
results suggest  the following  summary  pattern.  Total spending  tends to go up with higher
ETHNIC.  Yet local taxes  go up much  less with ETHNIC,  or may even  go down. So the higher
local spending  with higher  ETHNIC  is financed  by a combination  of higher  debt  and deficits,  and
more  intergovenumental  transfers.
IV.  Sensitivity  Analysis
The consistency  of the pattern of our results  across different  levels  of aggregation  lends  us
some  reassurance  that the results are not badly  contaminated  by endogenous  migration,  even  if our
use of instrumental  variables  did not fully  resolve  such  endogeneity.  A remaining  concern  about
ETHNIC  and  per capita  income  is -.24 in the  city  sample,.0  16  in the  metro  sample,  and  -.077  in the
county  sample.
22our results is that they  could  reflect  some  unobserved  third  factor  that affects  both public  goods
and ethnic  divisions. We addressed  this in two ways. First, we managed  to obtain  data for 1960
for some  of our variables  in order  to do panel  estimation  controlling  for unobserved  heterogeneity.
These  results have  a number  of problems  that we describe  below.  Second,  we tried plausible
omitted  variables  in the cross-section  estimation,  such as percent  black, crime, population  density,
Democratic  share of vote  for President,  and state dummies.
A.  Unobserved  heterogeneity  with  panel data
We concentrated  on obtaining  data for 1960,  since  we wanted  a long enough  time period
that could  allow  some  intertemporal  variation  in the variables. In  fact, the time variation  in Ethnic
is very small. Even  between  1960  and 1990  the absolute  median  change  in this variable  was 0.04.
Hence,  we did not even  try to obtain  data for 1970  and 1980.
We faced  several  problems  in using  the 1960  city  and county  data (metro  data was
unavailable  for 1960).  First, jurisdictions  change  boundaries  over time and so we need  to check
that the unit of analysis  (city, county,  etc.) remains  relatively  unchanged  from 1960  to 1990.  We
investigated  this issue  using  data on land  area of cities  and counties.  We found  that county  land
areas remain  largely  constant,  while  city land areas  have  risen substantially  from 1960  to 1990,
and at an uneven  rate across cities.  A regression  of 1990  area on 1960  area yielded  an R2 of .99
for counties  and only .32 for cities. For  this reason,  we decided  to use only the county  data in our
panel  exercise.
Second,  we faced  the problem  that the 1960  data only identified  three ethnic  groups:  white,
black,  and other. We redid  our 1990  ETHNIC  calculation  using  the sarne  three-way  classification
and used this for our panel exercise.  We also were  forced  to use attainment  of high-school  degree
rather than of a BA degree  because  the latter  was unavailable  in the 1960 sample.
For all of these  reasons,  the results  with panel  data should  be taken only as suggestive  at
best.
23Table VI shows  the panel  results for our core  variables:  the share of education  spending,
the share  of roads spending,  and road spending  per capita.  Although  ETHIC  loses significance
under  fixed  effects  with a full set of controls,  the share variables  display  a significant  and negative
bivariate  association  with ETHNIC  using  fixed  effects. We note,  by the way, that the same  occurs
to most of the other  controls,  namely  in the regressions  with a full set of controls  most of them  are
insignificant.  Ethnic  remains  significant  with several  combinations  of controls,  but looses  it when
income  per capita  and high school  graduates  are introduced. For  the road share  variable,  the
bivariate  coefficient  on ETHNIC  under fixed  effects  is more  than twice as large as the bivariate
coefficient  in the county  cross-section  in Table IV. The coefficient  on ETHIC  in the bivariate
fixed  effects  regression  for education  share is about  the same  as in the corresponding  regression  in
Table IV. The result  on roads  spending  per capita is positive  and significant  in the bivariate
association  under fixed  effects,  and insignificant  with  the full set of controls.  Using  random  effects,
all three  variables  are negatively  and significantly  related  to ETHNIC  both with and without  the
full set of controls.
Which  set of results should  we  take more  seriously?  On one hand,  the fixed  effects
estimator  has the virtue  that it doesn't  require  the country  effects  to be orthogonal  to the right-hand
side  variables.  A Hausman  test indeed  rejects  orthogonality  for 5 of the 6 random  effects
regressions  in Table  VI. On  the other  hand, the fixed  effects  estimator  is very costly  in degrees  of
freedom  in a sample  with  a large  cross-section  but only two time periods.  We do not think  that the
strong  cross-section  results  should  be disregarded  because  of the insignificance  of ETHIC  in the
fixed  effects  regression  with all controls.  Given  the data problems  discussed  above,  we take some
comfort  from the surprisingly  supportive  results  from  the bivariate  fixed effects  regression.
Be Cross-sectionalResults
We think  a more  promising  approach  is to directly  test the effect  on the ETEHIC
coefficient  of including  plausible  variables  that were omitted  in the regressions  for table IV. The
24results of our sensitivity  analysis  for our core dependent  variables-shares of spending  on roads,
public  education  and trash pickup-are presented  in table VII. The entries  in the table report
coefficients  on the ETHIC  variable  in different  specifications  we tried (each  coefficient
corresponds  to one regression).  The first row  reports  the baseline  coefficients  on ETHNIC  from
the regressions  in table IV. Each  of the subsequent  rows reports  the results  on the ETHNIC
variable  when  we control  for additional  variables  or split  the sample  in different  ways. We
organize  our discussion  below  by the type of robustness  checks  we undertake.
The first issue we look at is the individual  components  of the ETHNIC  variable. The
largest  minority  in American  localities  is, of course,  blacks. Not surprisingly  the share of blacks
(BLACK)  is correlated  quite  strongly  with ETHNIC. 33 Therefore  one may wonder  if ETHNIC  is
practically  equivalent  to BLACK,  which  may  imply  different  interpretations  of our results
presented  thus far. The difference  between  the two variables  lies in whether  all ethdic  groups  are
treated  symmerically:  (1) ETHNIC  captures  divisions  between  five  ethnic groups  while  BLACK
captures  only black vs. non-black; (2) ETHNIC  treats as equivalent  two observations  (a) 70
percent  whites and 30 percent  blacks  and (b) 30 percent  whites  and 70 percent  blacks,  whereas
BLACK  implies  the two are very different. If, for whatever  reason, BLACK  was  the "true"
variable  affecting  local fiscal  behavior  then the coefficients  on ETBIC  should  go to zero  when
BLACK  is included  in the regressions.  The second  row  of table VII in which  we control  for
BLACK  and BLACK-squared  shows  that this is not the case. Results for the road-share  dependent
variable  are about the same  as in the baseline  case and statistically  significant  at conventional
levels  for all three samples. The magnitude  of the relationship  between  ethnic  heterogeneity  and
share of spending  on roads  becomes  slightly  stronger  in the metro  sample  and slightly  weaker  in the
33  The  correlation  coefficient  for  the city,  metro,  and county  samples  are 0.58,  0.72  and 0.80  respectively.
25county  sample  (compared  to base-line  coefficients).3 4 Results  for education  share do not change
significantly  in the metro sample,  but become  weaker  in the county  sample:  the magnitude  of the
point  estimate  drops  to about a half of its value  in the baseline  case and the associated  standard
error increases  from 0.025  to 0.041 (p-value  = 0.20). However,  neither  BLACK  nor BLACK-
squared  is significant  in any of the education  share regressions.  Because  of the fairly  high
correlation  between  ETHNIC  and BLACK  in the county  sample  (0.80)  the reduction  in the t-
statistic  on the ETHNIC  variable  is likely  due to multicollinearity. 35 On  the other  hand,  the results
for sewerage  spending  become  stronger  with  the additional  controls  of BLACK  and BLACK-
squared. 36 Overall,  we do not find a systematic  effect  of BLACK  for our results and the continued
strong  results on ETHIC  indicate  that it is not  just proxying  for BLACK  in its effect on public
goods  provision.
Another  closely  related  question:  do our results  on ETHNIC come  about  because
government  fiscal  outcomes  are different  depending  on whether  whites or blacks  are in charge (i.e.
whether  the median  voter is black  or white)?  The  travails of black majority  cities such  as
Washington  DC are well  known.  Moreover,  it is true that black majority  cities have  much  higher
E.THNIC  (.46)  than do white  majority  cities (.27),  because  white  majorities  are usually  larger  than
black  majorities.  So ETHNIC  could  just be proxying  for black majorities  vs. white  majorities.
This turns out not to be true. We test the idea by restricting  the sample  to localities  with a
white  majority. If the effect  of ETHNIC  on our fiscal policy  variable  was due to the difference
between  black-majority  and white-majority  cities,  then the coefficients  on ETHNIC  should  go
34 Estimated  coefficients  on  Black and  Black-squared  are  not significant  in the  city  or metro  samples.  For
the  county  sample  the  estimated  coefficients  (with  t-statitistics  in parenthesis)  on  Black and  Black-squared
respectively  are as  follows:  -0.093  (451) and 0.162  (4.021).  The  implied  turning  point  in the quadratic
is Black = 0.29.
35 The  reduction  in the  magnitude  of  the coefficient  indicates  that majorities'  reaction  to increasing
minority  share  (by  reducing  expenditure  on  public  education)  is somewhat  weaker  when  the  minority
which  is increasing  in population  share  is non-black.  There  is however  only  weak  evidence  for  this since
this  is not  true  in the  metro  sample  and is also  not  true  for other  types  of productive  good  spending.
26toward  zero in the solely  white-majority  sample. In fact, when  we rerun all our regressions  on the
sample  of localities  with a white  majority  our results are almost  entirely  unchanged.  This result  is
unsurprising  since  the vast majority  of the sample  consists  of white-majority  localities  (92 percent
in cities, 100  percent  in metro  areas, and 98 percent  in counties).  Thus our results are consistent
with the idea  that white  majorities  vote  to reduce  the supply  of productive  public  goods  as the share
of blacks  and other  minorities  increases.3
The  next issue we look  at for checking  the sensitivity  of our results  is the effect  of
population  size and concentration.  Although  we controlled  for log of the city  population  in the
base regressions  we now split  the sample  by population  size  to check  for potential  non-linear
effects.  Since  the public  goods  problems  of big urban areas are well-known  we address  the
concern  that the nature of the relationship  between  ethnic  heterogeneity  and public goods  may be
different  in big versus  small  cities. In particular,  we see if the results are being  driven  by the worse
outcomes  in big cities versus  the rest of the sample. The  third row of table VII shows  the results
on ETHNIC  when  we restrict  the sample  to the top quintile  of observations  by population. The
next row shows  the results  for the complement  sample  to the above. All regressions  have  log of the
city population  as one  of the controls. If our results  presented  earlier  were simply  masking  the
difference  between  big and small  urban areas,  the findings  on ETHNIC would  disappear  when  we
look at them separately. The reported  coefficients  in the second  and third rows of table VII show
that this is not the case. ETHNIC  is significant  at 5% in all specifications  except  for the  top-
quintile  metro regressions  in which  it is significant  at 10%. The top-quintile  metro  sample  has only
36  The  estimated  coefficients  (with t-statistics  in parenthesis)  on Black  and Black-squared  respectively  are
as follows:  0.237  (3.67)  and -0.314  (-3.24).  The  implied  turning  point  in the quadratic  is Black  = 0.36.
37  A serious  statistical  analysis  of  localities  with  a black  majority  is almost  impossible.  The  samples  are
too small. In the  city  or county  sample,  there  are  between  21 and  40 observations  (14 -33 degrees  of
freedom).  There  are  no  black  majority  metropolitan  areas. In the  black  majority  cities,  ETHNIC  will
increase  as the share  of blacks  decreases  and as  the  share  of  whites  increases  (a check  of  the sample  shows
that  the  variation  in ETHNIC  in the  black  majority  cities  is driven  mainly  by  black  vs. white).  In the  black
2761 observations.  Looking  at changes  in the magnitude  of the coefficients  on ETHNIC  the biggest
changes  are for the top-quintile  regressions-big cities,  counties,  and metro  areas seem  slightly
different. However,  it is difficult  to see a systematic  pattem in this "difference"  except for the
education-share  regressions.  The impact  of ethnic  heterogeneity  on education  spending  is
considerably  greater  in big urban areas for both the metro  and county  samples. For roads  the
effect  is bigger  in magnitude  in big cities  but smaller  in big metro  areas and counties. We conclude
that relationship  between  ethnic  heterogeneity  and public  goods  spending  is robust  to both big and
small  cities and that for education  the problem  may  be exacerbated  in big urban areas. Related  to
the issue  of big urban areas  we look at population  density  as a possible  omitted  variable  driving  the
results. Row 5 in table VII presents  the results. Controlling  for population  density  leaves  the
coefficients  on ETHNIC  virtually  unchanged  from  their base-line  values.
Another  possible  omission  from our right-hand  side variables  is the crime  rate in cities.
Cities  with higher  crime  rates  may be associated  with greater etinic heterogeneity  and smaller
spending  shares  on roads,  education  and sewerage  (because  of greater  spending  on police for
instance). Indeed  in our sample  crime  is positively  correlated  with ethnic  heterogeneity  and
negatively  with spending  shares  on education,  roads, and sewage. In row 5 we add violent  crime
per capita  as one of the control  variables. 38 Results  on ETHNIC  do not change  significantly  except
for education-share  in the county  sample  in which  the coefficient  reduces  to about  half of its value
in the baseline  case (the  standard  error does  not change  much:  0.025 vs. 0.028). Although  the
coefficient  is significant  at 10%  level  of confidence  the reduction  indicates  that part of the effect
may be going  through  the variation  in crime  rates.
majority  city  sample  with  36  observations,  just for  the record,  the  only  statistically  significant  result  is that
the  share  of police  spending  still  goes  up  with  ETHNIC.
38 Violent  crime,  as defined  by  the  Census  Bureau,  includes  murder,  forcible  rape,  robbery,  and
aggravated  assault.
28We next consider  the Democratic  share  of the vote for president  as a possible  omitted
variable. Cities with greater  shares  of minorities  may be Democrat  cities or counties,  which  may
affect  their fiscal decisions.  The sixth row  in table VII shows  that controlling  for this for the metro
and county  samples  does  not alter our findings  on ETHNIC. 39
Our final concern  is heterogeneity  across states. States  could  vary in their institutional
arrangements  for provision  of public services.  The last row in table VII shows  the results  on
ETHNIC  with a complete  set of state dummy  variables. There is a slight  reduction  in the
coefficients  for road-share  regressions,  with  the most pronounced  effect in the county  sample.
ETBIC  is significant  at conventional  levels  in all three samples. For sewerage  spending  the
coefficient  on ETHNIC  remains  virtually  unchanged  from its base-line  value. For the education
share  there is a reduction  in magnitude  of the point estimate  for the metro sample  but not for the
county  sample. In the metro  sample  ETHIC  is on the cutoff  point  for significance  at the 10%
level  and in the county  sample  it is significant  at the 1%  level. Overall  the results on ETNIC
seem  robust to controlling  for state-specific  effects.
To summarize,  the results of our sensitivity  analysis  indicate  that the described  empirical
relationship  between  ethnic  heterogeneity  and spending  on core  public goods  is robust  to
controllling  for a broad array of possible  omitted  variables. While the estimated  coefficient  on
ETHNIC  changes  somewhat  depending  upon  the specification,  in most cases the estimated
coefficient  lies within  the 95% confidence  interval  associated  with the baseline  estimate.
V. Conclusions
More ethnically  diverse  jurisdictions  in the United  States  have higher  spending  and higher
deficits/debt  per capita,  and yet devote  lower shares  of spending  to core  public  goods  like education
and roads. The higher  spending  in more  ethnically  diverse  jurisdictions  is financed  in part by higher
intergovermnental  transfers rather  than by local taxes.  This pattern is broadly  consistent  with
39 We  do  not have  these  voting  data  for the  city  sample.
29political  economy  theories  in which  heterogeneous  and polarized  societies  will  value public  goods
less,  patronage  more,  and will be collectively  careless  about  fiscal discipline.
These  results  point  to some  interesting  future  research  questions.  The  issue of ethnic
fragmentation  is obviously  related  to the problem  of racial  segregation,  since  ethnically  fragmented
jurisdictions  are often  segregated.  An important  question  that we want to pursue in further  research
is how  the negative  effects  of ethnic  fiagmentation  on public  goods  relate  to segregation.  First of
all, as we mentioned  above,  if ethnic  fragmentation  with segregation  leads  to a low supply  of public
goods  (particularly  education),  then  the segregated  disadvantaged  ethnic  group may fall further
behind  perpetuating  a vicious  circle.  Note that public  school  is not the only  example  of this.
Wilson  [19961,  for instance,  notes  that poor public  transportation  systems  from inner  city  ghettos
to the location  of job opportunities  increase  the costs  of finding  and keeping  jobs for inner  city
minorities.  In Washington  DC, by way of anecdote,  the segments  of the metro  that served  poor
black  neighborhoods  were  the last (by many  years)  to be completed  - some  are still not completed
today.
Second,  since  ethnic  fragnentation  is associated  with public goods  problems  documented
in the present  paper, policymakers  may  be tempted  to choose  segregation  and decentralization  in
order to enforce  relatively  homogenous  communities.  Benabou  [1996b]  presents  a model  in this
spirit,  where  stratification  by income  is more  efficient  in the short run to deal with heterogeneity  in
the production  process. However,  there is a second  dynamic  effect:  stratification  increases
heterogeneity  and therefore,  in the long run decreases  economic  efficiency.  We think  there are
analogous  questions  to be pursued  for stratification  by ethnic  group. While separation  of ethnic
groups  may have  some  short term benefits,  it may  have devastating  long  run costs.40
4  Segregation  has  decreased  in the  last  twenty  years,  as noted  by  Cutler,  Glaser  and Vigdor  [19961.  It
would  be interesting  to investigate  what  effect  this has  had  on urban  public  goods.  One  currently  popular
story  worth  testing  is that the  most  successful  blacks  are  moving  to the suburbs;  those  left  in the inner  city
30In summary, our results contribute to explaining why the problem of urban public goods in
America appears so difficult. The public goods problem is linked  to another problem that also
appears almost insurmountable: ethnic divisions.
neighborhoods  are perceived  as more  and more  different  from the white majority  lving in white
neighborhoods;  the ethnic polarization  and the public  goods  problems  get even  worse.
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34Appendix:  Description of the Data
Definitions  of variables  are the same  in all datasets  so details  on variables  are given in the city  section  and
not repeated  in the metro and county  sections.
L City Data
The city  data (except  for the library  data, see below)  are all downloaded  electronically  from the CD-ROM
version of the 1994 County and City Databook  (CCD),  published  by the Bureau of the Census.
Our most comprehensive  city  sample  consists  of 1083  observations.  It includes  the 1070 incorporated
places  of population  25,000  or more counted  in the 1990  Census,  8 Census  Designated  Areas  of Hawaii
(since  Hawaii has no incorporated  places  recognized  by the Bureau of Census) and the five boroughs  of
New  York city.' For consistency  we treat New  York  City as one entity and don't use the observations  on
the five boroughs  since  for some  of our measures  the data are not provided  on a breakdown  by borough
basis.
We checked  the data for anomalous  values  by sorting  each variable and examining  the extreme high and
low  observations. This procedure  led us to exclude  two  anomalous  observations:  Streamwood  IL, which
has 0 for local government  expenditure,  and Superior  WI, which  has 0 for local government  taxes. We
discuss  the handling of other data anomalies  below.
1. City government spending
The CCD data on city government  spending  are collected  from the 1992 Census  of Governments.
Expenditure  includes  capital outlay  and interest  on debt.
As described  in the Government Finance and Employment Classification Manual, June 1992, expenditure
includes  anything  executed  in the city  budget,  regardless  of whether it is partly  or wholly  financed  by a
higher level of government.
Expenditure  categories  given in the County and City  Databook are Education,  Health and Hospitals,
Police  Protection,  Fire Protection,  Public Welfare,  Hghways, and Sewerage  and Solid  Waste
Management.  These categories  are not exhaustive,  as noted in the text of the paper.
Education  includes  local government  operated  elementary  and secondary  schools,  and any universities,
colleges,  junior and! or community  colleges  operated  by the local government.
Health and Hospitals  includes  treatment  and immunization  clinics,  environmental  health services,
ambulance  services, support  for private  hospitals,  and construction,  maintenance  and operation  of public
hospitals.
Police  includes  patrols, communications,  custody  of persons  awaiting  trial, and vehicular inspection.
Waste  Management  includes  sanitary  and storm sewers,  sewage  disposal,  street  cleaning,  pickup  and
disposal  of garbage.
Some  functions  are usually  executed  by other levels  of government  and so appear with zero spending  in
many cities. Education  spending,  for example,  has 866 zeroes  out of 1020 observations  (the New  England
states and Virginia  account  for almost  all of positive  education  spending  by cities).  Education  is usually
In all our  regressions  we exclude  two cities that have  unexplained  zeroes  for some  variables  on the CD-
ROM,  as explained  next: Streamwood  IL and Superior  WI.executed  by counties  or special  school  districts,  and so does not pass through the city  budget Likewise,
health and hospitals  has 306  zeroes out of 1020,  and welfare  has 750 zeroes  out of 1020.  We did not run
regressions  for expenditure  variables  with a majority  of zeroes.
Even spending  on seemingly  unavoidable  city government  functions  is sometimes  not assigned  to cities.
To take a random example  -- Bowie,  Maryland,  a suburb  of Washington  DC, shows  zero spending  on
police. Bowie  does  not have its own city  police  force; crime  victims in Bowie  summon  the Prince Georges
County  police  instead. (This problem  is not that serious  for police  spending  - there is only  one other  zero
police observation  in the sample.) Fire and waste  management  also have some zeroes  (65 and 77,
respectively,  out of 1020  observations).
The (hopefully  random)  way in which  different  kinds of expenditures  are assigned  or not assigned  to
different  levels  in different  cities  will introduce  some  noise into the other  public  spending  share dependent
variables. As we discuss  in the text, we use datasets  at different  levels  of aggregation  in part to make sure
that the results do not depend  on arbitrary  expenditure  assignment  between  levels.
The electronic  data for expenditure  and taxes  per capita  on the CD ROM did not match the printed
version in the CCD, and included  some  absurdly  high values. When  we recalculated  the per capita figures
from aggregate  spending  and population  data, the calculated  values came close  to reproducing  the printed
values  in the CCD  and stayed  within a plausible  range.
Intergovernmental  revenue  per capita includes  amounts  received  from other governments  as fiscal aid in
the form of shared  revenues  and grants-in-aid,  as reimbursements  for performance  of general government
activities  and for specific  services  for paying government  (e.g. care of prisoners or contractual  research) or
in lieu of taxes. Excludes  amounts  received  from other governments  for sale of property,  commodities,
and utility services.
2. Ethnic classification  data
1990 Census  data are reported  according  to how  people identify  themselves  on a list that includes  Black,
American  Indian, Asian, White,  and Other. Hispanic  is not a mutually  exclusive  category  with the other
ethnic classifications,  since  Hispanics  can be of any race. "Other" in the above  list seems  to proxy  for
Hispanic,  as the two have  a correlation  of 0.91.
3. Educational  attainment
Educational  attainment (BAGRAD)  is is from a sample  of persons  25 years and over  performed  in the
1990  census.
4. Income data
Data on income in 1989  were collected  during the 1990  census  from a sample of persons 15  years old and
over. Money  income includes  wage  or salary  income,  self-employment  income,  interest dividends,  social
security  benefits,  welfare  income,  and retirement  income. The definition  of Household  is all persons  who
occupy  a housing  unit, defined  as a house,  apartment,  mobile  home, or a single room  occupied  as separate
living quarters.
IL Metro areas
The metro  data are downloaded  from the 1994  CD ROMs called the City and County
Compendium  (CCC) and City and County  Plus (CCP),  which are an expanded  electronic  version  of the
publication  City and County  Extra, by Slater  Hall Information  Products.The metro sample  includes  all Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas (MSA's) and Primary Metropolitan
Statistical  Areas  (PMSA's)  from the City and County  Extra of Slater  Hall Information  Products,  Inc.. The
minimum  size for metropolitan  area is 50,000. The metro  data aggregates  all levels  of local government
in the metro  area, including  county,  school  district,  other local district, and city.
PMSA's are MSA's that form part of a larger  Consolidated  Metropolitan  Statistical  Area
(CMSA). Baltimore  and Washington  PMSAs  together  make  up the Baltimore-Washington  CMSA,  for
example. We decided that PMSA's are likely  to be closer  than CMSA's to the concept  of regional
political  economy  that we wished  to capture.
The definition  of MSA  includes  a generous  definition  of the urban hinterland.  The Washington
DC PMSA,  for example, includes  Montgomery,  Prince Georges,  Frederick, Charles,  and Calvert  Counties
in Maryland,  Alexandria,  Arlington,  Fairfax,  Loudon,  Prince William, Stafford,  Clarke,  Warren,
Fauquier,  Culpeper,  Spotsylvama,  and King George  Counties  in Virginia, and Berkeley  and Jefferson
Counties  in West  Virginia. This makes  the metro  data in general  more aggregated  than the county  data.
We checked  the data for anomalous  observations  by sorting each  vanable and examinimg  the high
and low  values. This procedure  leads  us to exclude  Honolulu,  which strangely  has a zero value  for
education  spending,  and New York  City,  which  has extreme  values for expenditure  and taxes  per capita
(3.5 and 3.3 times larger than the second  largest observations,  respectively).  Although  many might
believe  that taxes and spending  are extreme  in the Big Apple,  we found  the population  base implicit  in
this extreme  figure in the data diverged  from the reported  population  by a factor of 3.
We excluded  the local debt  per capita observation  for RICHLAND-KENNEWICK-PASCO,  WA
(MSA),  because  it is larger  by a factor  of 4 than the second  largest observation. We have the vague
memory  that there is a public  utility nuclear  plant boondoggle  going on here, but we have not checked  it
out further.
The expenditure  share data includes  classification  for spending  in the following  categories:
education,  health and hospitals,  police,  welfare,  and roads.  The only  one of these  categories  with some
zero  observations  was welfare  (18 zeroes  out of 307  observations).  As in the other  datasets,  these
categories  are not exhaustive.IIL County Data
The county  data are also  downloaded  from the 1994  CD ROMs called the City and County
Compendium  (CCC)  and City and County  Plus (CCP)  by Slater  Hall Information  Products. The county
data aggregates  all levels  of government  located  in the county - city, school  district, county,  and any
other.
These data cover  the full 3,140 counties  in the US. Some  of the counties  are thinly populated-
the minimum  in the sample  for population  in 1990  is 52. As explained  in the text we decided  to focus  on
"urban" counties because of our focus on urban public goods. We therefore chose counties with
populations  above  25,000,  the same  population  minimum  the CCD  uses  for cities. This reduced  the
sample  to 1,462  counties.
As with the other data sets, we checked  for anomalies  by sorting each variable  and examining
extreme  values. We noticed systematic  problems  with sample  observations  in Virginia - many have zero
spending  on core local government  functions  like roads  and education. We concluded  that Virginians are
illiterate  and have no roads.
No,  just kidding  -- further investigation  revealed  that Virginia  (alone  among the 50 states) has
independent  cities listed  separately,  which messes  up data reporting. For example,  both Fairfax  City and
Fairfax County  are listed  with their own data for all concepts.  If - for example -- the Fairfax county  road
authority  handles  the roads  for both  city and county,  and the Fairfax  city school  board handles  the
education  for both city  and county  -- then there will  be a zero entry  for road spending  in Fairfax  city and
for education  spending  in Fairfax county.  Not knowing  how  to resolve  this problem,  we wound  up
omitting all data for Virginia.
Counties  in Hawaii  were anomalously  zero  or near zero for education  spending,  just as
Honolulu's  education  spending  was strangely  zero in the metro  data. We omitted  counties  in Hawaii  from
the dataset.
The other data anomaly  that we noticed  and corrected  was that federal  expenditure  per capita
were listed  as zero for four counties  in New  York  City  - New  York County  itself,  the Bronx, Queens,  and
Richmond.  This  would  imply  there were no federal  judges or welfare  recipients  in New York City,  which
contradicts  conventional  wisdom.  A check  of the published  source  revealed  that these data were not
reported  because  of problem  of assigning  expenditure  between  these counties  within New  York City. We
substituted  NA's for the zeroes.
The county  data, like the metro  data, includes  classification  for spending  in the following
categories:  education,  health and hospitals,  police,  welfare,  and roads. In the sample  that we used, two  of
these categories  still showed  some zero entries,  probably reflecting  assignment  of these functions  to
higher levels  of govermnent. There  were 207 zeroes  out of a sample of 1386  observations  in welfare  and
13  zeroes  out of 1386  for health and hospitals.Policy Research  Working Paper  Series
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